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The valuation of employee stock options has become a key requirement due to the
rapid growth in the use of these options as a means of employee compensation.
IFRS 2 Share-based Payment stipulates that these instruments must be valued and
expensed on the date the awards are issued. This dissertation aims to value an
employee stock option, in a case where both the equity and vesting (performance)
condition are based on a reported earnings process. The equity dependency on
earnings stems from the fact that we are primarily concerned with the valuation of
employee stock options that are issued by a private firm. We implement a capital
structure framework provided by Goldstein, Ju and Leland (2001). In this frame-
work, equity and debt are derived from an underlying EBIT process that is gov-
erned by a geometric Brownian motion. The model also accounts for taxation and
bankruptcy. The research aim is addressed by incorporating the capital structure
model into our employee stock option pricing framework.
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Employee stock options (ESOs) are contingent claims on the equity of a firm. These
are contracts that an entity grants to its employees. Such contracts entitle the holder
to an option payoff, based on the equity value of the firm. These contracts are
particularly common among executive and management remuneration packages,
as a way to incentivise their performance. Generally, employees are only entitled
to the option payoff if certain vesting conditions are satisfied. A vesting condition
is either a service condition or a performance condition that must be met in order
for an employee to exercise the employee stock option (ESO).
The valuation of employee stock options has become a key requirement due to
the rapid growth in the use of these options as a means of employee compensation.
Importantly, employee stock option valuation methodologies must comply with
general accounting standards. From an accounting point of view, these instruments
are considered to be a share-based payment, and should therefore be recognised
as an expense. A guide to the accounting treatment and valuation principles of
employee stock options is detailed by IFRS 2 Share-based Payment.
IFRS 2 Share-based Payment requires an entity to value and recognise share-
based payment awards to employees or other parties in its financial statements.
The act states that a grant date model needs to be used to value these awards.
Under this model, an entity is required to estimate the fair value of a share-based
payment award that is issued to an employee on the grant date. To calculate the
fair value of share-based payments, IFRS 2 does not require entities to use specific
option pricing techniques. However, the guide does suggest the supplementary
use of Monte Carlo simulation techniques for share-based payment awards that
are based on vesting conditions.
A complicating factor in the valuation of employee stock options is the fact
that these instruments are non-transferable; the employee cannot sell these options.
Holders of ESOs are therefore at a disadvantage to holders of traded stock options,
who are entitled to sell their options at any point in time. Furthermore, since the
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employee cannot trade freely in either the option or the underlying stock, this sug-
gests that the pricing of ESOs may not follow classical replicating portfolio pricing
arguments. However, the IFRS guide specifies that the option must be priced using
traditional risk-neutral option pricing techniques. Additionally, to price the instru-
ment under the risk-neutral measure, the risk-neutral dynamics of the real-world
vesting conditions need to be determined. This is particularly important if vesting
conditions are based on dynamic market or company performance measures.
The central aim of this study lies in the valuation of employee stock options
issued by a private firm. Given that we are concerned with a non-listed firm, the
option pricing framework incorporates a model which estimates the equity value
of the firm from a reported earnings process. In addition to this, we are particu-
larly concerned with a vesting condition that relates to the same earnings process.
In this investigation, the EBIT (earnings before interest and taxation) process serves
as our proxy for earnings. It follows that the underlying process in the option pric-
ing framework is the firm’s EBIT, which is not a traded asset. Consequently, we
are faced with another complexity in that the risk-neutral drift of the EBIT pro-
cess needs to be determined. Accordingly, this dissertation also presents various
methods to calibrate for this unknown parameter. In this study, we use a static cap-
ital structure framework proposed by Goldstein et al. (2001), which includes our
desired model of equity as a function of an underlying EBIT process. However,
despite the fact that the study by Goldstein et al. (2001) concentrates on an opti-
mal capital structure model, we focus on rather using a version of the model that
remains consistent with the firm’s current capital structure. The optimal capital
structure condition is only considered to serve as a means of obtaining comparable
results.
The structure of the dissertation is as follows. Chapter 2 discusses previous
literature relating to employee stock option pricing and capital structure models.
Chapter 3 then defines the option pricing framework, along with the static capital
structure model proposed by Goldstein et al. (2001). Chapter 4 begins by describ-
ing the data used in the analysis. It then details the methodology that has been
followed to implement the option pricing framework. Chapter 5 applies the de-
scribed methodology to value the employee stock option, and presents the results
along with a detailed explanation outlining the necessary calibration procedures.
Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation with a brief discussion of key findings
and a discussion around potential avenues for future research.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Valuation of Employee Stock Options
Hull and White (2004) emphasise that the non-marketability of an employee stock
option is a problematic feature from a derivatives pricing perspective. Hull and
White (2004) value non-vanilla type employee stock options using a binomial tree,
similar to that proposed by Cox, Ross and Rubinstein (1979). The model accounts
for the non-transferability and the early exercise behaviour of employees. The early
exercise opportunities are available whenever an option has vested, the stock price
has reached a certain multiple of the strike price, or when the option has terminated
or forfeited. In a similar study, Aboody (1996) uses a modified binomial option
pricing model provided by Cox et al. (1979). The employee stock option is valued
by modifying the model to account for the differences between ESOs and traded
stock options. These differences are the non-transferability, vesting schedule and
premature job termination features inherent in these contracts.
Despite the clear disparities between employee stock options and traded stock
options, industry practitioners are routinely using the Black and Scholes (1973) for-
mula (or a non-risk adjusted modification of this) to value these contracts (Hall and
Murphy, 2002). Hall and Murphy (2002) argue that such an approach would fail
to distinguish between the employee stock option’s company cost and employee
value. The fact that these options are non-transferable certainly implies that there
is a divergence between employee value and company cost.
2.2 Modelling Earnings Performance Measures
In order to derive a suitable valuation of ESOs, the dynamics of the vesting con-
ditions need to be modelled. Generally, performance-based vesting conditions are
based on the operational performance of the firm and it usually relates to some
form of earnings metric.
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It is evident that throughout the financial literature, geometric Brownian motion
(GBM) is a common assumption for modelling the behaviour of financial processes.
Besides modelling stock price behaviour, GBM is also commonly used to model the
behaviour of the firm’s asset process and performance measures within a firm, such
as EBIT and EBITDA. This is evident in the works presented by Hackbarth, Hen-
nessy and Leland (2007), Sundaresan and Wang (2007), Duffie and Lando (2001)
and Goldstein et al. (2001). On the contrary, Genser (2006) presents an arithmetic
Brownian motion (ABM) approach to model EBIT. His main motivation in choos-
ing this model is that it allows for earnings performance measures such as EBIT
and EBITDA to be negative. This phenomenon is possible in reality and is not
captured by GBM. Additionally, we see that Chiang, Davidson and Okunev (1997)
present a stochastic mean-reverting model as an alternate form of modelling earn-
ings. Furthermore, Sarkar and Zapatero (2003) model earnings as a mean-reverting
process, and defend the use of such dynamics with sound economic reasoning and
empirical support.
This study aims to derive a valuation methodology of an employee stock option
for non-listed firms. It implies that the equity value may need to be derived by
utilising suitable capital structure models and observable performance metrics. In
particular, we attempt to model the firm’s equity value based on an observable
EBIT process.
2.3 A Review of Capital Structure Models
The theory of capital structure models was first pioneered by Modigliani and Miller
(1958). Throughout the literature, it is evident that the pricing of equity and debt
in these models are based on an assumption on the dynamics of the firm’s value
process. The firm’s debt and equity are then priced as contingent claims on the
value process. The most notable studies where this is evident are Black and Scholes
(1973), Merton (1974), Black and Cox (1976), Geske (1977), Leland (1994), Longstaff
and Schwartz (1995) Leland and Toft (1996) and Goldstein et al. (2001).
The modelling and pricing of debt securities introduce a notion of credit risk
and default. The literature is seen to focus on two types of bankruptcy. In the first
kind, bankruptcy occurs when the firm value decreases to such an extent that the
firm cannot issue additional equity to keep the firm alive. Such a bankruptcy con-
dition is known as an endogenous decision, and is outlined in the works presented
by Leland (1994) and Goldstein et al. (2001). In the second type of bankruptcy, the
default condition is exogenously specified. For example, bankruptcy is declared
due to some contractual condition that is not met (the firm is bankrupt due to some
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exogenously specified threshold). Notable studies that use the latter approach in-
clude Black and Cox (1976) and Longstaff and Schwartz (1995). It is apparent that
more recent capital structure literature tends to focus on incorporating an endoge-
nous bankruptcy condition. Sarkar and Zapatero (2003) claim this approach is in-
tuitive in the sense that as long as equity has residual value, a firm will still be
motivated and be able to issue new equity to pay off any outstanding debt obli-
gation, as opposed to defaulting. Leland (1994), Goldstein et al. (2001) and Sarkar
and Zapatero (2003) also argue that an endogenous bankruptcy condition is more
suitable for firms with long-term debt obligations.
In their seminal papers, Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) established
the concept of structural credit risk models. In their framework, it is assumed that
firm value is governed by a geometric Brownian motion and that the firm is fully
financed by one zero coupon bond with finite maturity. The debt will be hon-
oured only if the firm value exceeds the outstanding debt on maturity. If this is
not the case, the firm will declare bankruptcy. Black and Cox (1976) expanded on
this framework by acknowledging the possibility of default before the debt expires.
Leland (1994) made further developments in generalising capital structure mod-
els by incorporating taxation and bankruptcy costs. In this framework, manage-
ment (who acts on behalf of equity holders) maximise the value of the firm by
setting an optimal bankruptcy level and leverage ratio. Duffie and Lando (2001) la-
bel the class of such models as second-generation models. These models vary from
traditional capital structure models by allowing for an endogenous level of default,
which is optimally set to maximise the wealth of shareholders. Leland’s model
therefore allows for a formal characterisation of optimal capital structure. The
framework also incorporates the considerations of Modigliani and Miller (1958),
who emphasised that taxes are an important factor in assessing the optimal capital
structure of a firm due to the tax benefits of leverage. In Leland’s model, the firm’s
capital structure is comprised of both equity and a single perpetual bond that pays
a constant continuous coupon. Leland (1994) supports characterising debt with a
perpetual bond in two ways. He argues that debt with a long maturity implies
the principle has negligible value and can safely be ignored. He further states that
long time horizons are common in both theory and practice, where even the origi-
nal capital structure works by Modigliani and Miller (1958) assumed debt with an
infinite maturity. Lastly, he argues that another benefit of this approach is that a
perpetual debt permits the development of closed-form solutions for the value of
debt and equity, where equity and debt are claims on the firm’s value process. The
model further assumes a static capital structure, where it is assumed that the nom-
inal value of debt (once issued), remains unchanged through time. The same static
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capital structure arguments are also presented by Modigliani and Miller (1958) and
Merton (1974). Leland (1994) supports the use of a static capital structure, arguing
that additional debt issuances may hurt current debt holders and debt reductions
(via repurchases) may hurt current equity holders. However, he does note that a
dynamic optimal capital structure may be desirable, even though it is more difficult
to model.
Goldstein et al. (2001) addressed the dynamic optimal capital structure issue
raised by Leland (1994), by developing both static and dynamic EBIT-based capital
structure models. In traditional (static) capital structure models1, the state variable
is taken to be the firm value and is presumed to follow lognormal dynamics. A
common feature among these models is their treatment of cash flows to the gov-
ernment (via taxes). Specifically, these cash flows are accounted in a way that is
fundamentally different to the treatment of cash flows owed to equity and debt
holders. On the other hand, in the framework presented by Goldstein et al. (2001),
cash flows to the government are treated in the same manner to that of equity and
debt. Therefore, in this framework, the total value of the entity is seen to be re-
distributed among all claimants (equity, debt, government and bankruptcy). The
model also implies a significantly lower risk-neutral drift of the firm value pro-
cess, as opposed to those seen in traditional frameworks. Consequently, the model
predicts a higher probability of default, which in turn leads to lower optimal lever-
age ratios. On the basis of empirical support provided by Toft and Prucyk (1997),
Goldstein et al. (2001) model the dynamics of EBIT as lognormal, with the impli-
cation that all claimants to EBIT (equity, debt, government and bankruptcy) are
treated consistently. The framework also adopts the common assumption of the
separation of investment and financing policy. This follows from the fact that the
EBIT process is assumed to be invariant to changes in capital structure. The au-
thors argue that their approach has an intuitive appeal, as the EBIT process, which
is the source of firm value, runs independently of the manner in which EBIT is re-
distributed among the claimants. Specifically, an extra unit of currency paid out,
whether in dividend payouts, taxes or interest payments, will affect the firm value
in the same way (Goldstein et al., 2001). Hence, on this basis, the authors claim that
the choice of EBIT is indeed an appropriate state variable. Goldstein et al. (2001)
utilise a capital structure consisting of both equity and a perpetual debt that pays a
constant continuous coupon, where the bankruptcy threshold and coupon amount
are determined endogenously by management acting on behalf of equity holders.
The same capital structure and endogenous conditions are evident in Leland (1994).
1Examples of such models are presented by Brennan and Schwartz (1978), Leland (1994),
Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) and Leland and Toft (1996).
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Overall, a clear theme in the literature that is related to the valuation of em-
ployee stock options, is the focus on a valuation that accounts for the early exercise
opportunities and non-transferability of these contracts. It is evident that there is
a gap in the literature dedicated to the valuation of employee stock options that
incorporates an earnings-based equity model and an earnings-based vesting con-
dition. This is our primary task. Based on the literature survey, we now apply




This chapter attempts to explain the valuation problem using sound economic and
mathematical finance arguments.
3.1 Introduction
A central aim of this study is to utilise a suitable model that estimates the equity
value of a firm from an earnings process. To solve this issue, we adopt a static cap-
ital structure model proposed by Goldstein et al. (2001), who start their analysis by
taking the firm’s EBIT process as the state variable. This goes against most struc-
tural models, which instead take the firm’s value process as a given state variable.
Regarding EBIT as a state variable has a clear advantage in that it introduces a no-
tion of cash flows in both firm value and in the valuation of corporate securities.
In this setting, the EBIT process is seen as a source of firm value, which implies
that the value of the firm is a claim on EBIT. This ultimately forces a split of EBIT
into various claims, easing the interpretation of derived security values from an
economic point of view. In contrast to traditional capital structure models, this
framework allows for bankruptcy and taxation, which adds an intuitive economic
appeal.
3.2 Model of Equity
3.2.1 The EBIT and Value Process
In this framework, the EBIT processXt, is assumed to follow a geometric Brownian
motion with real-world dynamics given by
dX
X
= µpdt + σdW
P, (3.1)
where up and σ are constants representing the instantaneous growth rate (drift) and
the volatility of the EBIT process respectively under the real world measure P. W P
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is a standard Brownian motion under P. The evolution of the EBIT process under
the risk-neutral measure Q can be specified by
dX
X
= µdt + σdW
Q, (3.2)
where µ is the drift of the EBIT process under Q. By Girsanov’s Theorem, we have
that µ = µp − θσ, where θ is the risk premium or the Girsanov kernel which affects
the change of measure from P to Q. Note, in this framework, the EBIT process
under the risk-neutral measure does not inherit a drift rate equal to the risk-free
rate. This is simply because the EBIT process itself does not represent the value of
a traded security.1
We pause here and reflect on the necessity of considering the dynamics of EBIT
under the risk-neutral measure. We ultimately seek to price a contingent claim
(ESO) whose underlying process is the EBIT value of the firm. Such a price can be
derived using the principles of risk-neutral valuation. In addition, the existence of
a martingale measure Q is useful in the sense that it allows for the discounting of
future EBIT payments with the risk-free interest rate — a fact that is used to derive
the firm value.
The total firm value Vt, is defined as the discounted value of all future EBIT












provided that r > µ, where r denotes a constant risk-free interest rate. In the case
where r < µ, the present value of cash flows will be infinite — a case we do not
consider here. A detailed proof of the simplification is presented in Appendix A. As
discussed by Goldstein et al. (2001) and Genser (2006), this definition of firm value
also follows naturally if you consider the common (market practice) assumption of
the separation of the firm’s operating and financial decisions. That is, the value of
the firm’s assets is assumed to be independent of the capital structure. Since r and
µ are assumed constants, an application of Itô’s formula on Equation (3.4) yields
that both the firm value and EBIT process share the same dynamics:
dV
V
= µdt + σdW
Q. (3.5)
1The implication here is that the risk premium θ, differs from the usual risk premium µp−r
σ
, which
reflects the risk premium of traded securities and is enforced by arbitrage conditions.




= rdt + σdW
Q. (3.6)
Equation (3.6) simply states that under the risk-neutral measure, the total return
on the firm’s value process (which is a claim on EBIT) is the risk-free rate. In this
expression, XV is defined as a payout ratio. Equation (3.4) dictates that this ratio
remains constant since r and µ are assumed to be constants. Therefore, EBIT is
proportional to the firm value under geometric Brownian motion. Goldstein et al.
(2001) justify a constant payout ratio using an economic argument. They argue that
their framework treats cash flows to the government, equity and debt all in the
same manner. In addition, since an increase in firm value leads to an increase in
tax payments, this leads to a reasonable assumption that the payout ratio remains
constant.
3.2.2 Tax System
This framework incorporates the effects of taxation. It is an important considera-
tion as taxation plays a significant role in determining the actual amount owed to
equity holders. In addition, the model can account for the tax deductibility (ad-
vantages) of debt. Consequently, an inclusion of a tax-regime allows for a more
complete model in describing the economic environment of the firm.
The model assumes a simple tax structure that includes three different kinds of
taxes. Interest payments on debt are taxed at a rate τi. Corporate earnings after
tax are paid out as dividends, which are then taxed at τd. Finally, corporate profits
are taxed at τc, with full loss offset provisions. This implies negative corporate
earnings (occurs when EBIT net of coupon payment is negative) are eligible for a
tax refund. That is, the firm will always earn the tax shield of debt, even when the
taxable operating income is less than the outstanding debt (coupon payment). The
effective tax rate for equity holders can therefore be expressed as
(1− τeff ) = (1− τc)(1− τd). (3.7)
Table 3.1 illustrates the tax structure in the case of an unlevered and levered firm.
For an unlevered firm, corporate taxes are paid on the firm’s EBIT, X . The residual
amount is then paid out as dividends, which is taxed at the dividends tax rate. In
the case of a levered firm, the company taxes are reduced as the interest payment
on debt (the coupon amount, C) is tax deductible.
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Tab. 3.1: Tax regime
Corporate Taxes Interest Payment (Coupon) Taxes Dividend Taxes Total Taxes
Unlevered Firm τcX 0 τd(1− τc)X τeffX
Levered Firm τc(X − C) τiC τd(1− τc)(X − C) τeff (X − C) + τiC
3.2.3 The Case of a Debtless (Unlevered) Firm: Two Claimants
In this scenario, an unlevered firm is considered. Both equity and government
(or equivalently, cash flows owed to the government through taxation) will have a
claim on the firm’s earnings. Therefore, the current firm value, denoted by V0, is
shared between equity and government in the following manner:
Eq(V0) = (1− τeff )V0, (3.8)
G(V0) = τeff V0. (3.9)
We now proceed to the heart of the analysis. What follows are mathematical
arguments describing how a levered firm’s value process is redistributed among
all four claimants considered in this study. In the case of a levered firm, equity,
debt, government (through taxation), and bankruptcy are all claims on the firm’s
value process. The value of the firm is seen as a claim on EBIT.
3.2.4 The Case of a Levered Firm: Four Claimants
In the model presented by Goldstein et al. (2001), it is assumed that management
(acting on behalf of equity holders) chooses a static (one-time decision) debt level
that maximises the wealth of current equity holders. The firm is financed by both
equity and debt. The debt is characterised by a single perpetual bond with a con-
stant continuous coupon level, denoted by C.2 Debt holders will receive this pay-
ment as long as the firm remains solvent. The issuance of the perpetual debt implies
that the threshold at which the firm declares bankruptcy, denoted by VB , is time in-
dependent. Should the firm choose to default, the value of the firm will be VB and
an amount αVB will be forfeited to bankruptcy costs.
Given the dynamics of the value process of the firm,
dV
V = µdt + σdW
Q,
it follows that any claim/derivative whose value can be expressed as a function of
the firm’s value and time, must satisfy the following partial differential equation
2In continuous time, the actual coupon payment is Cdt over the infinitesimal interval dt.





σ2V 2FV V + Ft + P = rF, (3.10)
where F (V, t) denotes the value of this claim and P is the payout flow associated
with this claim. This result can easily be derived by using an application of the
famous Feynman Kâc Theorem. A description of this theorem is outlined in Ap-
pendix A. Due to the issuance of perpetual debt, the value of all debt and default
claims considered in this framework will be time-independent. The PDE therefore
simplifies to the following ordinary differential equation (ODE):
0 = µV FV +
1
2
σ2V 2FV V + P − rF. (3.11)
The general solution3 to the ODE is given by

































The parametersA0, A1, andA2 are constants determined by considering the bound-
ary conditions of the securities under consideration. Note, A1 = 0 for all claims of
interest. This is simply due to the fact that y is negative, leading to an explosion of
the first term in Equation (3.12) as V becomes large.
Equation (3.12) represents the value of a default or debt claim on the value pro-
cess that is governed by Equation (3.5). This relationship is important, as it allows
one to derive relationships for the claimants of concern (equity, debt, government
and bankruptcy), by carefully considering various claims and using the principles
of the accounting equation. It is well known that the accounting equation essen-
tially states that all assets of a firm are either financed by debt or equity. Expressing
this analytically we have,
A = Eq + L, (3.13)
where A denotes the value of the firm’s assets, Eq represents the shareholders’
equity and L denotes the firm’s liabilities. One of these claims considered is the
3An example of the proof can be found in Shimko (1992).
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Arrow-Debreu bankruptcy claim, denoted by PB(V ). PB(V ) defines the present
value of a claim that will pay one unit of currency in the event of bankruptcy (firm
value reaching VB) and zero otherwise. The value of this claim satisfies Equation
(3.12) and can therefore be expressed in the form,
PB(V ) = A0 +A1V
−y +A2V
−x, (3.14)
where the constants A0, A1 and A2 are determined by considering the following
limiting behaviour. If the firm’s value process V increases, the security’s value
should approach zero since it will become less likely that the firm will default.
In addition, should V approach the bankruptcy threshold VB , the security’s price
must approach one. Expressing this mathematically, we have,
limV→∞ PB(V ) = 0 and limV→VB PB(V ) = 1.
Both these boundary conditions infer that the value of the Arrow-Debreu bankruptcy







Additionally, a default claim denoted by Vdef (V ), is defined as a claim that pays
the value of the firm in the event of default (VB), and zero otherwise. Using similar
limiting arguments, it follows that
limV→∞ Vdef (V ) = 0 and limV→VB Vdef (V ) = VB .
Therefore, the firm value in the event of bankruptcy can be expressed as






Since the total value of the firm can be split between solvent and insolvent claims,




= Vsolv (V ) + Vdef (V ), (3.17)
where Vsolv (V ) denotes the firm value during continued operations. While the
firm remains solvent (V > VB), equity, debt and government share the earnings
X through dividends, coupon payments and taxes respectively. Using Equation
(3.17), the solvent value is described as
Vsolv (V ) = V − VBPB(V ). (3.18)
Next, the solvent value of a perpetual debt issue before taxes is considered, and
is denoted by Vint(V ). This claim pays the coupon amount C as long as the firm
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remains solvent and pays nothing in the case of default. During solvency, the rele-
vant payout of this claim is the coupon amount, P = C. This implies that the value





noting that Equation (3.19) is a particular solution to Equation (3.11). The limit
condition, limV→∞ Vint(V ) = Cr , implies that A0 =
C
r and A1 = 0. For V = VB , the




[1− PB(V )]. (3.20)
An application of Equation (3.13) immediately defines the equity value of the firm
before taxes,
Eqsolv (V ) = Vsolv (V )− Vint(V ). (3.21)
Under the proposed tax regime, the solvent value of equity becomes
Eqsolv (V ) = (1− τeff ) [Vsolv (V )− Vint(V )] . (3.22)
Investors will value the solvent value of the perpetual debt as
Dsolv (V ) = (1− τi)Vint(V ). (3.23)
Finally, the share of the solvent firm’s value owed to the government amounts to
Gsolv (V ) = τeff [Vsolv (V )− Vint(V )] + τiVint(V ). (3.24)
The first term in Equation (3.24) represents the taxation due to dividends and cor-
porate earnings. The last term reflects the tax payments on the interest (coupon)
payments. In this framework, we can easily see that the sum of all three claims
adds up to the firm’s solvent value. Concretely, the following relation holds:
Vsolv (V ) = Eqsolv (V ) +Gsolv (V ) +Dsolv (V ). (3.25)
The model also considers the possibility of bankruptcy for a levered firm. Due to
the limited liability nature of the firm, the value of equity in the event of default is
zero. That is,
Eqdef (V ) = 0. (3.26)
At this point, the remaining firm value (the value of the insolvent firm as speci-
fied by Equation (3.16)) will be divided among debt holders, the government and
bankruptcy costs as follows:
Ddef (V ) = (1− α)(1− τeff )Vdef (V ), (3.27)
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Gdef (V ) = (1− α)τeff Vdef (V ), (3.28)
BCdef (V ) = αVdef (V ). (3.29)
It is easy to see that these three claims sum to the value of the insolvent firm,
Vdef (V ) = Ddef (V ) +Gdef (V ) +BCdef (V ). (3.30)
To summarise, we note that the total firm value V , is the sum of the solvent
part of the firm (Equation (3.18)) and the value of the firm in the case of bankruptcy







= Vsolv (Vt) + Vdef (Vt)
= Eq(Vt) +D(Vt) +G(Vt) +BC(Vt)
= [Eqsolv (Vt) + Eqdef (Vt)] + [Dsolv (Vt) +Ddef (Vt)] + [Gsolv (Vt) +Gdef (Vt)]
+BC(Vt).
Hence, we can see that the total value of the firm is redistributed among the equity,
debt, government and bankruptcy claimants. This result is similar to the “pie”
model presented by Modigliani and Miller (1958). The model presented by Gold-
stein et al. (2001) shows that the total pie, which represents the value of all claims,
is split among the four claimants in an optimal and economically intuitive manner.
In this framework, the total values for equity, debt, government and bankruptcy
can be expressed as follows:
Eq(V ) = (1− τeff ) [Vsolv (V )− Vint(V )] , (3.31)
D(V ) = (1− τi)Vint(V ) + (1− α)(1− τeff )Vdef (V ), (3.32)
G(V ) = τeff [Vsolv (V )− Vint(V )] + τiVint(V ) + (1− α)τeff Vdef (V ), (3.33)
BC(V ) = αVdef (V ). (3.34)
Thus, from Equations (3.4) and (3.31), the closed form solution for the equity value






















where the max condition enforces limited liability.
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3.2.5 The Bankruptcy Level and Optimal Coupon Amount
In the static capital structure model proposed by Goldstein et al. (2001), it is as-
sumed that management sets a constant default barrier VB to maximise shareholder
wealth, subject to limited liability. Therefore, the bankruptcy level is chosen en-
dogenously and the firm is not constrained by any covenants. Consequently, de-
fault will only occur if the firm cannot pay the instantaneous coupon payments by
issuing additional equity.
Equations (3.16) – (3.18) imply that the total value of the firm is maximised by
fixing VB as low as possible. However, due to the limited liability of the firm, equity
is required to be positive for all values of V > VB . The lowest possible value for VB



















To determine the optimal capital structure, it is assumed that management chooses
the coupon amount (debt level) to maximise the wealth of equity holders. Specifi-
cally, a coupon level is set to maximise the sum of debt and equity. In this scenario,
the debt does not expand the assets of the firm but instead gets passed on to the
equity holders. In other words, the current equity holders will earn the fair value
of the debt claim sold. If V0 is the firm value on the bond issuing date, the optimal
coupon C∗ is obtained by solving for,
















A = τeff − τi (3.41)
and
B = λα(1− τeff ). (3.42)
4See Dixit (1993) for a detailed description of this condition.
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Note, we assume that there are no issuance (restructuring) costs of the debt. The
full derivations of the bankruptcy level (Equation (3.37)) and the optimal coupon
level (Equation (3.40)) can be found in Appendix A.
To summarise, the optimal capital structure model provided by Goldstein et al.
(2001), enforces a one-time capital structure decision of management, whose objec-
tive is to maximise current shareholder wealth. However, it should be noted that
we need not be constrained to use the optimal coupon level C∗. We can however,
use an arbitrary coupon level C that remains consistent with the current capital
structure of the firm in question. With a perpetual debt issuance, and assuming
that EBIT is governed by a geometric Brownian motion, it is possible to derive
closed-form solutions for all claimants on the firm’s value. In particular, Equation
(3.35) expresses a relationship for the equity value of the firm as a function of the
firm’s EBIT. This is our desired model of equity and is directly used to evaluate the
payoff of the employee stock option.
3.3 Option Pricing Model
On the basis of the mathematical arguments presented so far, the option pricing
framework can now be defined. The contract only permits one exercise date, where
at maturity, the employee is entitled to the option payoff if the vesting condition is
satisfied. The payoff for this instrument is given as,
I{XT∗≥X0β} (ST (XT )−K)
+ , (3.43)
where
XT ∗ = sup
s≤T
Xs (3.44)
is the running maximum of the firm’s EBIT. T denotes the term of the contract,
ST (XT ) represents the terminal share price, K is the strike of the employee stock
option and X0 denotes the value of EBIT on the grant date. Typically, in order to
exercise these options, the firm’s EBIT is required to at least surpass the risk-free
rate of growth over the term of the option. In this case, we have β = 1 + r, where
β serves as our performance-based vesting condition. The payoff is equivalent to
that of a vanilla call with a barrier condition. The indicator serves as a knock-in
barrier and essentially states that the contract will only vest should EBIT breach
the performance barrier. The strike is structured as the product of a predefined
EBIT multiple (κ) and the value of EBIT on maturity of the contract (XT ), less the
total outstanding debt (D(VT )). Therefore, the strike considered here is stochastic
in nature. The EBIT multiple κ is generally determined by management and is
specified on the grant date (valuation date) of the option.
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Based on the context given so far, it is clear that we can derive the premium of an
employee stock option using the principles of risk-neutral valuation. Specifically,
the value of an ESO can be expressed as,
C0 = EQ
[

















Using Equations (3.4), (3.32) and (3.35), it follows that
































The formulation of the strike will incentivise staff to increase the net earnings (prof-
itability) of the firm. Specifically, employees will attempt to maximise earnings af-
ter debt repayments. Since we are using a static coupon repayment C in our model,
we are imposed to use the value of the debt claim D(VT ) in the strike, as this quan-
tity is allowed to vary and further incorporates the possibility of default. Therefore,
using D(VT ) will essentially allow a penalty to be incurred if the value of EBIT falls





where the enterprise value represents the market or fair value of the firm’s assets.
In this regard, the strike can be interpreted as a measure of the expected terminal
equity value of the firm (by principle of the accounting equation).
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3.3.1 Liquidity and Dilution Factors
As discussed earlier, employee stock options are not traded. This implies that
traded stock options should have a greater value, since these instruments can be
sold at any stage before maturity of the option. Accordingly, we could include a
discount (liquidity) factor in the option payoff to account for the non-transferability
of an employee stock option. Furthermore, a dilution factor should also be con-
sidered. At maturity, the firm is required to settle the value of the option. This
payment is sourced from the firm, necessitating a change in the capital structure.
The fact that we have imposed a perpetual debt implies that the firm cannot raise
additional debt to finance the option payout. Therefore, the firm will list additional
shares to raise the necessary capital. In doing so, the current shareholders’ claim
to equity is diluted. Accordingly, the value of the option needs to be reduced by a
relevant dilution ratio. This ratio can be given as:
Dilution ratio =
no. of shares in issue
no. of shares in issue + no. of new shares issued
. (3.48)
We have mentioned approaches to account for the non-transferability and dilu-
tion effect of ESOs. In the remainder of this study, we do not consider these effects.
However, we stress that an adjustment for both the liquidity and dilution is neces-
sary to calculate the fair price of an employee stock option. Moreover, our model
does not account for forfeiture of the contract, due to the employee leaving the firm.
3.4 Discussion
We end this chapter by discussing two main assumptions inherent in this frame-
work, in the context of an employee stock option valuation.
3.4.1 Perpetual Debt Issuance
We can justify the perpetual nature of debt by noting that companies tend to refi-
nance or replace their long-term debt, in order to reduce the cost of capital, main-
tain lower effective tax rates and to increase/leverage equity returns. However,
we note that utilising optimal perpetual debt in the context of an employee stock
option valuation may be unrealistic for a particular firm, based on their current
capital structure. Accordingly, in Chapter 5, we price the option under a debt level
(coupon) which remains consistent with the firm’s current capital structure. The
option is also priced under an optimal debt level, although this is purely for com-
parative purposes.
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We have presented a framework which incorporates a static capital structure
(the coupon level remains unchanged). Employee stock options typically do not
possess long-term maturities. Therefore, this may motivate the use of a static struc-
ture. However, a dynamic-based capital structure model may be more realistic,
although this significantly complicates the exposition and is beyond the scope of
this research.
3.4.2 A GBM-based EBIT Process
Assuming that EBIT follows a geometric Brownian motion has a distinct disad-
vantage that EBIT may not be negative. However, since employee stock options
are generally not characterised by long-term maturities, one could argue that the
occurrence of negative EBIT would be rather rare. In this regard, GBM may be
an appropriate model. Furthermore, it should be noted that it is common market
practice to model a wide array of financial processes with GBM, and that the great
benefit of using GBM lies in its tractability. To account for the shortcomings of
GBM, we note that Sarkar and Zapatero (2003) and Genser (2006) model EBIT as
a mean-reverting process and an arithmetic Brownian motion process respectively.
Both frameworks also model the same claimants on the firm’s value process (equity,




The base case parameters presented by Goldstein et al. (2001) are used to provide
insight into the economic characteristics that are inherent in their framework.
The data of a prominent publicly traded company are used to price an employee
stock option. The data comprise of the firm’s bi-annual financial statements, span-
ning over a period of June 2000 to June 2017. Although this is a publicly traded
firm, we shall assume that it is a South African private company, and refer to it as
Company A. The valuation date (grant date) for the employee stock option is 25
June 2017.
4.2 Methodology
We aim to derive the fair value (premium) of an employee stock option for the firm
in question. This is achieved by directly computing Equation (3.45), with the aid
of a Monte-Carlo simulation. Specifically, the valuation is derived by performing a
Monte-Carlo simulation using 5,000,000 sample paths for the firm’s EBIT process.
The simulation checks for default using monthly EBIT observations. Furthermore,
we check that the vesting condition is satisfied by verifying (path-wise) if the EBIT
process outperforms the vesting condition β over the tenor of the option. Equation
(3.47) highlights that the strike of the option is highly dependent on the prede-
fined EBIT multiple κ. Management would ultimately decide on this multiple by
considering the corresponding option premium (aka IFRS expense). Therefore, we
present prices with respect to various EBIT multiples as a solution to the valuation
problem. In addition to this, it was previously mentioned that κ can be regarded
as a suitable performance multiple, in order to allow the strike to be interpreted
as an expected equity value. Therefore, management can look at a history of these
performance multiples as a guide in selecting an appropriate κ value.
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In order to implement the option pricing model, the complete dynamics of the
EBIT process needs to be determined. Namely, the drift and volatility of the firm’s
EBIT process must be derived. We resort to common market practice by estimat-
ing the volatility using historical data. Specifically, historical EBIT values that are
reported in the firm’s bi-annual financial statements are considered to estimate the
volatility. In this option pricing framework, the underlying process is the firm’s
EBIT. Given that the employee stock option is not a traded instrument and the un-
derlying EBIT process is not a traded asset, it is not possible to construct a portfolio
that replicates the value of the option. This restriction implies that we may have
to value the reward by incorporating the real-world risk and perform real-world
pricing techniques. However, the IFRS guide clearly states that we need to price
employee stock options using traditional risk-neutral option pricing techniques.
Therefore, the option must be priced under the risk-neutral measure Q. A unique
risk-neutral measure implies that there is a unique risk-neutral drift of the EBIT
process.1 Chapter 5 demonstrates that this drift can be obtained by performing a
calibration procedure using market data. Specifically, it is shown that there is only
one risk-neutral drift that coincides with the equity value of the firm. Two risk-
neutral drift calibration procedures are considered; an instantaneous and historical
calibrated drift approach. A full description of these procedures is presented in
Chapter 5.
1This follows directly from Girsanov’s Theorem.
Chapter 5
Results and Analysis
5.1 Economic Intuition of the Model
This section attempts to explain certain economic phenomena inherent in this frame-
work. The parameters considered here are highlighted in Table 5.1 below.
Tab. 5.1: Base-case parameters
Corporate Tax Rate, τc 0.35 Risk-Neutral Drift of EBIT, µ 0.03
Dividends Tax Rate, τd 0.20 Volatility of EBIT, σ 0.25
Interest Payments Tax Rate, τi 0.35 Initial EBIT, X0 100
Risk-Free Rate, r 0.045 Bankruptcy Loss Ratio, α 0.05
Figure 5.1 illustrates the relationship between the debt value of the firm and the
coupon level C for various levels of EBIT volatility σ and bankruptcy costs α. The
volatility of EBIT also conveys the risk of the firm, as we have the same σ present
for both the firm value and EBIT processes in this framework. At the outset, we can
see that the bond value first rises and then falls as the coupon level increases. This is
a direct result of the endogenous default level present in this model. A higher level
ofC has two effects on the debt value of the firm. The direct effect is that it increases
the bond value. The indirect effect is that it raises the bankruptcy threshold VB . A
higher bankruptcy trigger implies a greater probability of default, which in turn
reduces the bond value. For higher coupon levels, this indirect effect will dominate
and the debt value will eventually become a decreasing function of C. The peak
of each curve indicates that the debt value reaches a maximum value for some
coupon level. In other words, there is a debt capacity for the firm. Figure 5.1a
shows that firms with lower risk will have a higher debt capacity (and vice versa).
Furthermore, we note that riskier firms will have a higher debt value than less risky
firms for very large coupon levels. As expected, Figure 5.1b highlights that both the
debt capacity and debt value of the firm fall with an increase in bankruptcy costs.
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(a) effect of σ
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(b) effect of α
Fig. 5.1: Debt value vs coupon level for various σ and α
Figure 5.2 illustrates the relationship between the sum of debt and equity and the
coupon level for various levels of volatility. The optimal coupon is that which
maximises this relationship. Therefore, the optimal leverage ratio for each level
of volatility is determined by the values of equity and debt at the peak of each of
these curves. Table 5.2 displays the optimal capital structure for each level of firm
risk, and clearly indicates a negative correlation between the optimal leverage ratio
and the earnings volatility. In other words, the optimal leverage ratio of less risky
firms (firms with smaller σ) is always greater than that of riskier firms (firms with
higher σ). The results also show that the optimal coupon is smaller to the coupon
which maximises the debt value of the firm. The model therefore suggests that it is
not optimal for firms to utilise their entire debt capacity.
coupon level





















Fig. 5.2: Sum of equity and debt vs coupon level for various σ
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Tab. 5.2: Effect of σ on the optimal capital structure
σ Optimal Coupon Equity Debt Optimal Leverage Ratio
0.15 240.51 838.44 3149.34 0.79
0.20 246.67 945.50 2976.57 0.76
0.25 262.44 1009.76 2867.31 0.74
Figure 5.3 indicates that the optimal coupon is a decreasing function of bankruptcy
costs. As bankruptcy costs rise, the probability of default decreases1. This, in turn,
decreases the yield spread on the perpetual bond. This phenomenon is illustrated
in Figure 5.4. The graph also shows that the yield spread on an optimal perpetual
debt rises when there is an increase in firm risk. Figure 5.3 further highlights that
the optimal coupon is a convex function of volatility. This means that firms with
low or high risk will optimally promise to pay a larger coupon. On the other hand,
firms with intermediate levels of risk will optimally commit to paying a smaller
coupon. The effect of the bankruptcy loss ratio on the optimal capital structure is
shown in Figure 5.5 and Table 5.3. These results show that the sum of debt and
equity decreases for higher bankruptcy costs.
Fig. 5.3: Optimal coupon sensitivity Fig. 5.4: Sensitivity of yield spread
1A lower coupon level implies a lower default trigger VB .
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coupon level





















Fig. 5.5: Effect of α on the sum of debt and equity
Tab. 5.3: Effect of α on the optimal capital structure
α Optimal Coupon Equity Debt Optimal Leverage Ratio
0.05 262.44 1009.76 2867.31 0.74
0.15 225.61 1273.67 2545.80 0.67
0.25 198.45 1486.52 2290.48 0.61
The effect of taxation on the equity, debt and government claimants is shown in
Figure 5.6. We can see that the equity value of the firm is a decreasing function of
the corporate tax rate τc. This is due to the fact that a rise in the corporate tax rate
increases the cash flows owed to the government, at the expense of equity.
corporate tax rate (τc)























Fig. 5.6: Effect of corporate tax on claimants
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The sensitivity of the equity value to changes in the initial EBIT and EBIT volatility
is displayed in Figure 5.7. As expected, higher EBIT values result in greater equity
values. Additionally, we can see that given an initial EBIT value, the equity value
rises steeply for an increase in volatility from low levels. On the other hand, the
relationship between equity and volatility flattens for an increase in volatility from
high levels. This is primarily due to the fact that the value of default losses dom-
inates the equity value for high levels of firm risk, as there is a greater chance of
default for riskier firms.
Fig. 5.7: Sensitivity of equity value
5.2 Preamble to Pricing the Employee Stock Option
Before we attempt to price the employee stock option, we need to highlight how
certain values reported in the firm’s financial statements relate to the parameters
and variables in the framework presented by Goldstein et al. (2001). This inter-
pretation is vital, as it allows one to correctly calibrate the risk-neutral drift of the
EBIT process. The reported enterprise value is a representation of the fair mar-
ket value of the firm’s assets. Therefore, we can think of the enterprise value as
a market value that is derived after the effects of taxation have been considered.
To elaborate, any buyer of the firm’s assets will only pay for the net asset value of
the firm, i.e. they will pay for the income stream generated by the assets after tax.
The fair asset value should therefore exclude any government claims. Using simi-
lar arguments, any buyer in the market will not be prepared to pay for bankruptcy
costs. Therefore, the fair asset value should exclude bankruptcy claims as well. The
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model proposed by Goldstein et al. (2001) states that the total firm value V0, is gen-
erated from an income stream that is redistributed among all claimants (including
the government and bankruptcy). It is therefore evident that this notion of firm
value does not coincide with the firm’s market value of assets (reported enterprise
value).
The total debt value reflected in the balance sheet is the total amount the firm
must pay to settle their outstanding debt, and can be interpreted as the face value
of debt. Fundamentally, this amount does not coincide with the variable D(V0)
in the model. The total debt claim D(V0), represents the bondholders’ valuation
(or market/fair value) of the debt. Furthermore, this claim includes bankruptcy,
whereas the debt value on the balance sheet does not consider bankruptcy. On the
basis of these arguments, we represent the total debt value reported on the balance
sheet as the model parameter VB (i.e. bankruptcy level = face value of debt). This
will enforce a natural scenario where the firm will be declared insolvent, if the
total firm value falls below the value owed to debt holders. The reported market
capitalisation (total equity value of the firm) can be represented by Eq(V0) in the
model. This is the case, as the reported market value for equity should include
the effects of taxation and bankruptcy. On the basis of these arguments, the total
debt and equity values reflected in the balance sheet are governed by Equations
(3.37) and (3.31) respectively. It should be noted that the model assumes a constant
default trigger VB . This implies that we are assuming that the total outstanding
debt remains constant over the tenor of the option. To conclude, we stress that the
smooth pasting condition (Equation (3.37)), must hold whether the coupon level
C is optimal or not, to enforce limited liability. Furthermore, it should be noted
that by allowing the total debt to be governed by Equation (3.37), we are forcing
the coupon amount to be intricately linked to the probability of default. This is
required as the coupon should always reflect the fair spread, which is related to
the probability of bankruptcy. To elaborate, in a scenario where we have a higher
coupon level C, the bondholders are extracting more cash from the EBIT stream.
Consequently, the firm value is more likely to reach the level of bankruptcy VB .
Such a scenario explains why C is required to be related to the notion of default.
5.3 Pricing the Employee Stock Option
In this section, we price the employee stock option across two main scenarios. In
the first scenario, the option is priced under an instantaneously calibrated risk-
neutral drift that is derived from spot EBIT and balance sheet values of the firm.
Although this method recovers the current EBIT value, we argue that this may be
5.3 Pricing the Employee Stock Option 29
a naive approach by noting that the EBIT process is sensitive to the current state of
the firm and can vary drastically depending on the current economic climate and
seasonal changes. To resolve this issue, we also use an option pricing framework
which incorporates an average EBIT process. Specifically, in this approach, the
option is priced using a historically calibrated drift that is derived from data over a
range of three years prior to the valuation date in question. We choose to calibrate
the risk-neutral drift over three years and assume the EBIT behaviour over this
tenor is indicative of future behaviour. The three-year period is also chosen as it
coincides with the option maturity length in question. Furthermore, the same risk-
free rate that is used in the option pricing model is applied to estimate the historical
drift. We therefore use the best estimate of the constant r that we believe rules for
the last three years and the next three years from the valuation date. In an ideal
world, we would need a term structure of risk-free and risk-neutral drift rates that
can be utilised in a model, which incorporates the time dependency of these rates.
However, the model considered in this framework relies on constant rates, and we
leave the development of a time-dependent model for future research.
Within each scenario, we also price an employee stock option under two capital
structure regimes. In the first regime, the option is priced in a framework which
coincides with the firm’s current capital structure. In the second regime, we im-
plement an optimal capital structure condition that is presented by Goldstein et al.
(2001). It is assumed that the firm will not restructure their debt (coupon level)
over the tenor of the option, as we have imposed a static capital structure model
in the option pricing framework. Pricing under the first regime implies that we
must use a coupon level C that remains consistent with the firm’s current capital
structure. To justify the use of this sub-optimal2 debt (coupon) level, it should be
noted that in reality, management may not want or be able to adjust their current
capital structure due to constrained market conditions and the elasticity of debt.
For example, risky firms may find it extremely hard to increase their debt levels,
as there may not be enough appetite in the market to absorb this risk. In addition,
high leveraged firms may find it difficult to reduce their debt levels, as it may come
at the expense of the firm selling their assets. In the optimal setting, the option is
priced under the assumption that management executes an optimal capital struc-
ture strategy (finds an optimal coupon level C∗) in order to maximise the wealth of
current equity holders.
Table 5.4 presents the data and parameters required to price an employee stock
option for the South African private company, Company A.
2Note, for the remainder of this study, “current capital structure” and “sub-optimal capital struc-
ture” are used interchangeably.
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Tab. 5.4: Firm and option pricing parameters
Valuation Date, t0 25 June 2017
Corporate Tax Rate, τc 0.28
Dividends Tax Rate, τd 0.20
Interest Payment Tax Rate, τi 0.28
Risk-Free Rate, r 0.0875
Bankruptcy Loss Ratio, α 0.05
EBIT Vesting Condition, β = 1 + r 1.0875
Option Maturity (Years), T 3
Volatility of EBIT, σ 0.3054
EBIT on Valuation Date (Millions of ZAR), X0 6438
Total Equity Value (Millions of ZAR), Eq(V0) 57623.44
Total Outstanding Debt (Balance Sheet) (Millions of ZAR), VB 13352
Number of Shares Outstanding (Millions), ns 960.548602
Current Earnings Performance Multiple, Enterprise ValueEBIT 9.89
The risk-free estimate was obtained from yield data of a ten-year South African
government bond. We choose a bankruptcy loss ratio of α = 5%. In other words,
only 1 − α = 95% of the available bankruptcy firm value VB can be distributed to
all bankruptcy claims.3 Lawyers therefore have a claim on 5% of the firm value in
the event of default.
5.3.1 Option Pricing Approach 1: Instantaneous Calibration
In order to implement the option pricing model, we need to calibrate for the three
unknown parameters. These parameters are; C (instantaneous coupon level), V0
(initial total firm value) and µ (risk-neutral drift of EBIT). This is achieved using
our known parameter values; X0 (initial EBIT value), Eq(V0) (current market value
of equity) and VB (bankruptcy level = face value of debt). Through the aid of the
mathematical relationships presented in Chapter 3, we can express the relationship
between the known and unknown parameters in a system of three equations with
three unknowns, and therefore obtain unique values for our parameters of concern.
Concretely, the calibration procedure is conducted in the following manner:
The current equity value of the firm is governed by:
Eq(V0, µ, C) = (1− τeff ) [Vsolv (V0, µ)− Vint(V0, µ, C)] , (5.1)
3Goldstein et al. (2001) use this value of α and base it on empirical evidence provided by Gruber
and Warner (1977).
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where,
Vsolv (V0, µ) = V0(µ)− VBPB(V0, µ), (5.2)
Vint(V0, µ, C) =
C
r


































Substituting Equations (5.2), (5.3), (5.4) and (5.6) into Equation (5.1) we have:





















Substituting Equation (5.9) into Equation (5.8) yields














We have now reduced the system to one equation in one unknown. Accordingly,
we can solve for µ using Equation (5.10), given that we have an initial value for
the equity value of the firm. Having obtained our estimate for µ, it follows that we
can solve for the remaining two parameters, C and V0 using Equations (5.9) and
(5.6) respectively. From this procedure, we obtain a total firm value estimate of
V0 = 123386.20 (millions of ZAR), an instantaneous coupon level of C = 2100.07
(millions of ZAR), and an instantaneous market calibrated risk-neutral drift of µ =
3.5322%. We refer to this drift as being “market calibrated” as we are estimating µ
based on the market/fair value of equity.
In Chapter 3, we explained that the optimal debt level is one that maximises the
sum of debt and equity. Figure 5.8 shows this sum as a function of the coupon level
C. Both the optimal and sub-optimal coupon levels are clearly depicted. The sub-
optimal coupon level is determined directly from the above calibration procedure.
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In this scenario, C is determined such that the default level VB coincides with the
total outstanding debt given in Table 5.4. As discussed earlier, it follows that we
have allowed C to relate to the probability of default, based on the firm’s current
debt level. This sub-optimal coupon remains consistent with the firm’s current
capital structure. The optimal coupon is determined directly by Equation (3.40).
coupon level (millions of ZAR)





































Fig. 5.8: Sum of equity and debt vs coupon level: approach 1
Table 5.5 summarises the firm’s capital structure under both optimal and sub-optimal
conditions.
Tab. 5.5: Capital structure summary: approach 1
Optimal Capital Structure Sub-Optimal (Current) Capital Structure
Coupon Level (Millions of ZAR), C 9331.25 2100.07
Debt (Millions of ZAR), D(V0) 59087.95 16666.79
Equity (Millions of ZAR), Eq(V0) 20525.60 57623.44
Leverage Ratio, D(V0)Eq(V0)+D(V0) 0.74218 0.2243
Corporate Bond Yield, CD(V0) 0.1579 0.1260
Default Level (Face Value of Debt) (Millions of ZAR), VB 59327.04 13352.00
The results show that should the firm opt to implement an optimal capital struc-
ture strategy, it should acquire additional debt (demand a higher coupon level).
However, such a drastic change may not be achievable based on current market
conditions and management policy. Hence, we also present results that are consis-
tent with the firm’s current capital structure.
The value of an employee stock option under each capital structure regime is
presented in Figure 5.9. The valuation is based on the data presented in Table 5.4
and 5.5, and further considers various EBIT multiples.
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EBIT multiple (κ)



























Price of Employee Stock Option vs EBIT Multiple (κ)
price under current capital structure
price under optimal capital structure
Fig. 5.9: Option premium (IFRS Expense) of employee stock option: approach 1
As expected, a higher strike (EBIT multiple κ) yields a greater probability of the
option ending out the money. Equivalently, a lower specified κ results in a larger
option premium. Our simulation results also show that 78.44% of the EBIT sample
paths satisfied the vesting condition. Table 5.6 gives the final premium values for
a single employee stock option under an optimal and sub-optimal capital structure
regime.
Tab. 5.6: Value of employee stock option for Company A: approach 1
EBIT Multiple 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Option Premium Using Current Debt Level
Upper Three-Standard Deviation Bound (ZAR) 47.40 47.30 45.71 42.04 37.42 32.50 27.49 22.44 17.39 12.33 7.27 2.22 0.01 0.00
Option Premium (IFRS Expense) (ZAR) 47.34 47.25 45.66 42.00 37.38 32.47 27.46 22.42 17.37 12.32 7.27 2.21 0.01 0.00
Lower Three-Standard Deviation Bound (ZAR) 47.29 47.19 45.61 41.95 37.34 32.43 27.43 22.40 17.35 12.31 7.26 2.21 0.01 0.00
Option Premium Using Optimal Debt Level
Upper Three-Standard Deviation Bound (ZAR) 24.24 24.24 24.23 24.18 23.94 23.31 22.08 20.15 17.47 14.05 10.02 5.51 0.88 0.00
Option Premium (IFRS Expense) (ZAR) 24.20 24.20 24.19 24.14 23.90 23.27 22.05 20.12 17.44 14.04 10.01 5.50 0.88 0.00
Lower Three-Standard Deviation Bound (ZAR) 24.15 24.15 24.15 24.10 23.86 23.23 22.01 20.09 17.42 14.02 10.00 5.49 0.88 0.00
We have merely presented the risk-neutral price implied by the market. To elab-
orate, the fact that we using the spot equity value in our model immediately dic-
tates that we are using a market implied risk-neutral drift. We now present a price
surface which highlights the sensitivity of the option price, as a function of the
risk-neutral drift parameter in the EBIT process. For illustrative purposes, the sen-
sitivity analysis is conducted under the assumption the firm issues an optimal level
of debt. In addition, this procedure is performed by fixing the firm value estimate
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V0, and allowing the EBIT value X0, to vary to accommodate various levels of µ.
Figure 5.10 highlights that the option premium is sensitive to the risk-neutral drift,
where it can be seen that the option price increases for larger values of µ. The price
increase stems from the fact that higher µ values imply greater terminal EBIT and
equity values. This results in a larger probability of the option ending in-the-money.
Furthermore, higher EBIT values imply a greater likelihood of the vesting condi-
tion being met, which in turn translates to larger option values. Figure 5.10 also
illustrates that larger values for µ allow strictly positive option values to be defined
over a greater range of κ values. This is a direct result of the positive correlation
between the equity value of the firm and the risk-neutral drift of EBIT.
The advantage of using an instantaneously calibrated risk-neutral drift lies in
the fact that we are using an estimate that is consistent with the spot values re-
flected in the firm’s financial statements. However, the high degree of sensitivity
illustrated in Figure 5.10, suggests that an instantaneously calibrated drift may be
a naive approach and that a historically calibrated drift should be considered. Fur-
thermore, a clear shortcoming in this calibration method lies in the fact that we
are using a spot EBIT value, which has its disadvantages (as alluded to earlier).
Thus, under this approach, we may derive significantly different premiums across
different valuation dates. Accordingly, we now resort to an option pricing frame-
work that incorporates an average EBIT process and utilises a historical calibrated
risk-neutral drift parameter.
Fig. 5.10: Sensitivity of employee stock option premium to µ
5.3 Pricing the Employee Stock Option 35
5.3.2 Option Pricing Approach 2: Historical Calibration
In this approach, we first perform the same calibration procedure (outlined in Sec-
tion 5.3.1) across multiple dates, where annual reported EBIT, equity and debt val-
ues over a period of three years prior to the valuation date are considered. From
this procedure, we obtain instantaneously calibrated µ values across each date.
These values are then averaged to derive a historical estimate of the risk-neutral
drift. This is denoted by µ̄. Once this is obtained, our unknown parameters are
now C, X0 and V 0. X0 and V 0 denote average values for the EBIT and firm value.
Using an average risk-neutral drift implies that we are using an average EBIT and
firm value process. Furthermore, if an average risk-neutral drift is utilised, we have
to use average EBIT and firm values to recover the current equity and debt level.
Lastly, to solve for the three unknown parameters, we perform a similar calibra-
tion procedure, where our known parameter values are now Eq(V 0), VB and µ̄.
From these procedures, we obtain an average risk-neutral drift of µ̄ = 4.6353%, an
instantaneous coupon level of C = 2023.09 (millions of ZAR), a total firm value es-
timate of V 0 = 122690.47 (millions of ZAR) and an EBIT estimate of X0 = 5048.35
(millions of ZAR).
In this approach, we have essentially averaged the risk-neutral drifts across
hypothetical valuation dates. Although Equation (3.4) only holds under the risk-
neutral measure Q, it should be noted that we are taking the reported EBIT values
and estimated total firm values over the three-year period to serve as initial con-
ditions in the GBM diffusions under Q. In other words, each reported EBIT value
and firm value estimate is denoted by X0 and V0 respectively, as we are effectively
assuming each reported date over the period serves as a valuation date. We are
therefore averaging the instantaneously calibrated risk-neutral drifts using market
data across each “valuation date.”
Figure 5.11 and Table 5.7 summarise the optimal and current capital structure
of the firm with µ̄ = 4.6353%.
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coupon level (millions of ZAR)






































Fig. 5.11: Sum of equity and debt vs coupon level: approach 2
Tab. 5.7: Capital structure summary: approach 2
Optimal Capital Structure Sub-Optimal Capital Structure
Coupon Level (Millions of ZAR), C 9136.88 2023.09
Debt (Millions of ZAR), D(V 0) 59204.39 16196.53
Equity (Millions of ZAR), Eq(V 0) 20148.73 57623.44
Leverage Ratio, D(V 0)
Eq(V 0)+D(V 0)
0.7461 0.2194
Corporate Bond Yield, C
D(V 0)
0.1543 0.1249
Default Level (Face Value of Debt) (Millions of ZAR), VB 60301.46 13352.00
The value of an employee stock option, for both levels of debt, is illustrated in
Figure 5.12. The numerical option values for each specified EBIT multiple are pre-
sented in Table 5.8. Additionally, with a drift of µ̄ = 4.6353%, there is a 79.74%
probability of satisfying the earnings-based vesting condition.
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EBIT multiple (κ)



























Price of Employee Stock Option vs EBIT Multiple (κ)
price under current capital structure
price under optimal capital structure
Fig. 5.12: Option premium (IFRS Expense) of employee stock option: approach 2
Tab. 5.8: Value of employee stock option for Company A: approach 2
EBIT Multiple 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Option Premium Using Current Debt Level
Upper Three-Standard Deviation Bound (ZAR) 49.67 49.58 48.21 45.18 41.41 37.40 33.30 29.18 25.05 20.91 16.77 12.62 8.48 4.34 0.19 0.00 0.00
Option Premium (IFRS Expense) (ZAR) 49.61 49.52 48.15 45.14 41.37 37.36 33.27 29.15 25.02 20.89 16.75 12.61 8.47 4.33 0.19 0.00 0.00
Lower Three-Standard Deviation Bound (ZAR) 49.55 49.47 48.10 45.09 41.33 37.32 33.24 29.12 24.99 20.86 16.73 12.60 8.46 4.33 0.19 0.00 0.00
Option Premium Using Optimal Debt Level
Upper Three-Standard Deviation Bound (ZAR) 25.74 25.74 25.73 25.69 25.52 25.08 24.26 23.02 21.33 19.22 16.72 13.89 10.76 7.42 3.91 1.51 0.63
Option Premium (IFRS Expense) (ZAR) 25.69 25.69 25.69 25.65 25.48 25.04 24.22 22.98 21.30 19.20 16.70 13.87 10.75 7.42 3.91 1.50 0.62
Lower Three-Standard Deviation Bound (ZAR) 25.65 25.65 25.65 25.61 25.43 24.99 24.19 22.95 21.27 19.17 16.68 13.85 10.74 7.41 3.91 1.50 0.62
In comparison to the results presented in the previous section, we can see that a
larger µ demands a larger option premium, and further allows strictly positive op-
tion premiums to be defined over a greater range of EBIT multiples. Furthermore,
the results show larger option premiums under an optimal debt level for larger
values of κ. For lower κ values, the price of the option is higher under the firm’s
current capital structure. This phenomenon follows mainly by considering the for-
mulation of the strike, and noting that the optimal capital structure commands a
higher coupon level than one which coincides with the firm’s current debt balance.
Figure 5.13 presents a typical distribution under the risk-neutral measure Q for
the terminal equity price of the firm (ST (XT ) in Equation (3.45)) using 50,000 sam-
ple EBIT paths.
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share price (ZAR)



















Distribution of Terminal Share Price
(a) Terminal share prices using current capi-
tal structure
share price (ZAR)




















Distribution of Terminal Share Price
(b) Terminal share prices using optimal capi-
tal structure
Fig. 5.13: Distribution of terminal equity price
Figure 5.13 illustrates that the average terminal equity price (in expectation) is
higher under the sub-optimal debt level. This is expected as the model suggests
that the optimal debt is higher than the firm’s current debt level. Furthermore, the
optimal coupon is derived by maximising the asset value (sum of debt and equity)
and not equity alone. Figure 5.13 also highlights that the terminal equity prices
will typically exhibit heavy-tailed and positively skewed distributions. Table 5.9
presents a summary of the terminal equity price statistics (under the measure Q)
for both capital structure conditions considered in this study.
Tab. 5.9: Summary statistics for terminal share price
Current Debt Level Optimal Debt Level
Average Terminal Share Price 71.04 34.96
Sample Kurtosis of Terminal Share Price 10.19 14.44
Sample Skewness of Terminal Share Price 1.91 2.55
Standard Deviation of Terminal Share Price 47.88 41.56
Figure 5.14 illustrates a typical distribution of the strike of the employee stock op-
tion (Equation (3.47)), for various EBIT multiples κ under the firm’s current debt
level. This distribution is also seen to be positively skewed. Furthermore, it can be
observed that we have a larger range of strike values for higher values of κ. This is
due to the fact that the minimum value allowed for the strike K is zero, and noting
that the larger the EBIT multiple, the smaller the likelihood of obtaining a strike
value of zero.
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strike value (ZAR)



















Distribution of Strikes for EBIT Multiple (κ) = 2
(a) Distribution of strikes for κ = 2
strike value (ZAR)















Distribution of Strikes for EBIT Multiple (κ) = 4
(b) Distribution of strikes for κ = 4
strike value (ZAR)



















Distribution of Strikes for EBIT Multiple (κ) = 5
(c) Distribution of strikes for κ = 5
strike value (ZAR)

















Distribution of Strikes for EBIT Multiple (κ) = 6
(d) Distribution of strikes for κ = 6
strike value (ZAR)



















Distribution of Strikes for EBIT Multiple (κ) = 8
(e) Distribution of strikes for κ = 8
strike value (ZAR)



















Distribution of Strikes for EBIT Multiple (κ) = 10
(f) Distribution of strikes for κ = 10
strike value (ZAR)



















Distribution of Strikes for EBIT Multiple (κ) = 12
(g) Distribution of strikes for κ = 12
strike value (ZAR)



















Distribution of Strikes for EBIT Multiple (κ) = 14
(h) Distribution of strikes for κ = 14
Fig. 5.14: Distribution of strike values under current capital structure
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5.3.3 Sensitivity Analysis
Since the option pricing framework assumes a constant volatility and risk-free rate,
it is worth exploring the effect of changes in these model input parameters on the
value of the option. The sensitivity analysis is performed using the same calibration
procedure to recover the current equity and debt values of the firm. The analysis
also utilises an average risk-neutral drift for EBIT. Figure 5.15 illustrates an option
pricing surface for various values of the volatility of EBIT, and highlights that the
option premium is an increasing function of volatility. Figure 5.16 portrays the
option’s sensitivity to changes in the risk-free rate. The illustration shows that a
change in the risk-free rate over the given range does not alter the option premium
to a great degree.




This dissertation aimed to value an employee stock option in a framework where
both the equity value and vesting condition are based on an underlying EBIT pro-
cess. The research aim was addressed by incorporating a static capital structure
model, provided by Goldstein et al. (2001), in the option pricing framework. The
model assumes that the EBIT process is the source of firm value and is governed
by a geometric Brownian motion. The model further assumes that the firm is
fully financed by equity and one perpetual bond that pays a constant continuous
coupon. With these assumptions, we have presented mathematical arguments that
describe the derivation of closed-form solutions, for all claims on the firm’s value
process. The claims of concern are equity, debt, government (through taxation) and
bankruptcy costs.
We considered two calibration approaches to estimate the risk-neutral drift pa-
rameter of the firm’s EBIT process. In the first procedure, an instantaneous risk-
neutral drift estimate was obtained, allowing the recovery of the spot EBIT value.
In the second approach, we utilised an average EBIT process, which allowed us to
obtain an average risk-neutral drift parameter. We argued that pricing using an
average risk-neutral drift may be more reasonable. We supported this argument by
noting that the EBIT process is sensitive to the current economic state of the firm,
and further noting a high degree of sensitivity between the option price and the
risk-neutral drift parameter. Additionally, we priced the ESO under a model which
recovered the firm’s current equity and debt value. The option was also priced
under an optimal capital structure condition (provided by Goldstein et al. (2001)),
as a means to obtain comparable results. The results showed that we can obtain
significantly different option premiums if the valuation is performed under an op-
timal capital structure, as opposed to a valuation which remains consistent with
the firm’s current equity and debt level.
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In this dissertation, we have presented a European-style employee stock option
pricing framework, where both the equity value and vesting condition are based on
an underlying earnings process. There are a number of possible extensions that can
be considered. Firstly, the framework can be extended to include early exercise op-
portunities. In addition, a dynamic capital structure model could be incorporated
in the option pricing framework. A further extension could see the development
of a model which incorporates a term structure of risk-free rates and risk-neutral
drifts of the earnings process. Lastly, a valuable consideration lies in the devel-
opment of an option pricing framework, which assumes alternate dynamics for
the firm’s earnings (for example, mean-reverting, arithmetic Brownian motion, or
stochastic volatility process).
Bibliography
Aboody, D. (1996). Market valuation of employee stock options, Journal of account-
ing and economics 22(1): 357–391.
Black, F. and Cox, J. C. (1976). Valuing corporate securities: Some effects of bond
indenture provisions, The Journal of Finance 31(2): 351–367.
Black, F. and Scholes, M. (1973). The pricing of options and corporate liabilities,
Journal of political economy 81(3): 637–654.
Brennan, M. J. and Schwartz, E. S. (1978). Corporate income taxes, valuation, and
the problem of optimal capital structure, Journal of Business 51: 103–114.
Chiang, R., Davidson, I. and Okunev, J. (1997). Some further theoretical and em-
pirical implications regarding the relationship between earnings, dividends and
stock prices, Journal of Banking & Finance 21(1): 17–35.
Cox, J. C., Ross, S. A. and Rubinstein, M. (1979). Option pricing: A simplified
approach, Journal of Financial Economics 7(3): 229–263.
Dixit, A. K. (1993). The Art of Smooth Pasting, Hartwood Academic Publishing.
Duffie, D. and Lando, D. (2001). Term structures of credit spreads with incomplete
accounting information, Econometrica 69(3): 633–664.
Genser, M. (2006). A Structural Framework for the Pricing of Corporate Securities: Eco-
nomic and Empirical Issues, Vol. 566, Springer Science & Business Media.
Geske, R. (1977). The valuation of corporate liabilities as compound options, Journal
of Financial and quantitative Analysis 12(4): 541–552.
Goldstein, R., Ju, N. and Leland, H. (2001). An EBIT-based model of dynamic
capital structure, The Journal of Business 74(4): 483–512.
Gruber, M. J. and Warner, J. B. (1977). Bankruptcy costs: Some evidence, The journal
of Finance 32(2): 337–347.
Hackbarth, D., Hennessy, C. A. and Leland, H. E. (2007). Can the trade-off theory
explain debt structure?, The Review of Financial Studies 20(5): 1389–1428.
Hall, B. J. and Murphy, K. J. (2002). Stock options for undiversified executives,
Journal of accounting and economics 33(1): 3–42.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 44
Hull, J. and White, A. (2004). Accounting for employee stock options: A practi-
cal approach to handling the valuation issues, Journal of Derivatives Accounting
1(01): 3–9.
Leland, H. E. (1994). Corporate debt value, bond covenants, and optimal capital
structure, The journal of finance 49(4): 1213–1252.
Leland, H. E. and Toft, K. B. (1996). Optimal capital structure, endogenous
bankruptcy, and the term structure of credit spreads, The Journal of Finance
51(3): 987–1019.
Longstaff, F. A. and Schwartz, E. S. (1995). A simple approach to valuing risky fixed
and floating rate debt, The Journal of Finance 50(3): 789–819.
Merton, R. C. (1974). On the pricing of corporate debt: The risk structure of interest
rates, The Journal of finance 29(2): 449–470.
Modigliani, F. and Miller, M. H. (1958). The cost of capital, corporation finance and
the theory of investment, The American economic review 48(3): 261–297.
Sarkar, S. and Zapatero, F. (2003). The trade-off model with mean reverting earn-
ings: Theory and empirical tests, The Economic Journal 113(490): 834–860.
Shimko, D. C. (1992). Finance in continuous time: a primer, Kolb Publ.
Sundaresan, S. and Wang, N. (2007). Investment under uncertainty with strategic
debt service, The American economic review 97(2): 256–261.
Toft, K. B. and Prucyk, B. (1997). Options on leveraged equity: Theory and empiri-




A.1 Derivation of Firm Value

































A.2 Feynman - Kâc Theorem in One Dimension






2FV V + Ft + P − rF = 0,
with boundary condition
F (T, VT ) = Φ(T, VT ),
can be expressed as an expectation:







t rsdsΦ(T, VT )
]
,
involving a diffusion of the form:
dVs = µ(s, Vs)ds + σ(s, Vs)dWs
Q, for t ≤ s ≤ T,
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where F (t, V ) is a differentiable function of t and V , µ is the drift of V under Q, r









Eqsolv(V ) = (1− τeff ) [Vsolv (V )− Vint(V )] ,











































































EV = D + E.
Using Equations 3.31 and 3.32 we have,
EV = [(1− τi)− (1− τeff )]Vint(V ) + (1− α)(1− τeff )Vdef (V ) + (1− τeff )Vsolv (V ).
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A = τeff − τi,
B = λα(1− τeff ).
